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ABSTRACT 
 
Is Cohesion policy effective? Does it contribute to the reduction of development disparities and 
strengthen competitiveness in the EU? These are the questions that have inspired a growing body of 
research on Cohesion policy evaluation, which has come to varied and inconclusive results. There 
has been significant variation with regards to the established (in) effectiveness of Cohesion policy 
among different methodological approaches. Ideally, the econometric tests would be able to 
provide conclusive results, which would represent the most convincing empirical proof. 
Unfortunately, the nature of Cohesion policy itself is posing serious limitations to the econometric 
approach, which has usually been limited to the direct testing of the macroeconomic impact of the 
resources. In order to circumvent these shortcomings, the authors have continued to rely on the 
econometric methods, but have nevertheless proved the benefits of using an indirect estimation 
approach. They have confirmed that Cohesion policy effectively increases the structural 
expenditures of the recipient Member States, thereby fulfilling one of the necessary conditions for 
effectiveness of EU transfers. Overall, effectiveness still depends on other conditions, among which 
the micro-efficiency of funds’ management and their effect on private investment stand out in 
particular. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Cohesion policy is an EU development policy, designed to reduce disparities in the development 
capacity of the regions and Member States lagging behind, while at the same time to contribute to a 
strengthened competitiveness and employment of all other areas. With €347 billion until 2013 at its 
disposal it represents the second largest item in the EU budget, after the Common Agricultural 
Policy, which means that its effectiveness is a subject of great interest due to the potentially high 
opportunity costs these funds might have.  
Whether the Cohesion policy resources contribute to convergence, higher growth of targeted areas 
and create jobs and strengthen competitiveness, remains, at least from the scientific perspective, 
an open question. As argued by (Ederveen et al, 2003: 31) “there is no consensus about the impact 
of Cohesion policy”. A slightly more specific assessment is put forward by (Molle, 2007: 253) who 
deems Cohesion policy as appropriate, although not perfectly efficient due to somewhat higher 
costs, but most controversy however seems to be related to its effectiveness. As far as effectiveness 
is concerned, there are wildly differing views expressed in the literature, which range from entirely 
to conditionally negative (Boldrin and Canova, 2001; Dall’erba et al 2007; Ederveen et al, 2006); to 
highly positive (Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger, 2005; Bradley and Untiedt, 2007; EIB. 2007; Venables and 
Gasiorek, 1999). Thus, “the debate on the overall effectiveness of EU regional policy is still largely 
inconclusive” as also argued by the OECD (OECD, 2007: 129).  
The differences in the assessment of Cohesion policy’s effectiveness can be explained to a 
considerable extent, though not entirely, by the methodological approach employed therein. The 
Macroeconomic Modeling approach; whose assessment of Cohesion policy is uniquely positive, has 
the advantage of being able to estimate the indirect effects and the counterfactual in the context 
of the general equilibrium itself, based on the micro-economic relationships. This approach is 
subject to criticism however, because its estimates are said to be the result of the structure of the 
model, which is imposed by the researcher and is hence subjective (Cappelen et al, 2003). This in 
turn is supposed to result in estimates that represent only the ex-ante assessment of potential, but 
not the factual impact of Cohesion policy (Ederveen et al, 2003). The second approach to evaluation 
of Cohesion policy’s macroeconomic effectiveness is represented through case studies, bottom-up, 
descriptive, contextual evaluations, which in spite of their ability to take into account specific 
features of  the activities under evaluation, are, to an even greater extent, subject to the problem 
of authors’ subjectivity. This is due to the “ad hoc” nature of the methodologies used. Furthermore, 
the bottom-up approaches are disadvantaged by their weak ability to assess indirect effects; there 
has been attempts to overcome this problem (Bradley et al, 2006; Venables and Gasiorek, 1999), 
however, these are again subject to objections from macroeconomic modeling approaches.  
Therefore, in an ideal world, the third approach, the “econometric” or “testing approach”, would 
seem to be the most appropriate as it directly measures the effect of the spent resources.  It too 
however is faced with methodological limitations as shown, among others, by the inconclusive 
results provided by this type of evaluation. A literature review shows (Wostner, 2009) that one 
cannot in general render econometric studies to give predominantly negative assessment as is often 
argued (e.g. Gripaios et al, 2008), although it is true that the non-robustness of the results seems to 
be almost a systemic property of this approach (Florax, 2002; Levine and Renelt, 1992; Roodman, 
2007). (Rodik, 2005) even goes as far as to argue that the econometric approach is entirely 
incapable of measuring the effect of economic policies as “policy interventions are not random and 
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their presence responds to unobservables” (ibid., 11).  
Notwithstanding such an extreme assessment, we would argue that there are three main arguments 
why the direct testing of the macroeconomic effectiveness of Cohesion policy resources is 
problematic. First, the Cohesion funds represent, in the context of multiple, more dominant and 
complexly interwoven determinants of economic growth, simply an economic shock that is (too) 
minute to allow for its clear econometric identification (OECD, 2007: 129). This argument is also 
related to the problem of threshold effects implied by new economic geography theory as pointed 
out for example by (Ottaviano, 2003) and (Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2007). Second, as regards its 
contents, Cohesion policy is highly heterogeneous both in terms of its purpose and in terms of the 
extremely varied “initial conditions”, addressed with in different target areas. Hence, a "simple" 
determination of the average macro-effects seems rather inappropriate in the case of such diverse 
contexts. Third, the available data, including that for Cohesion policy expenditures, does not allow, 
at least at this stage, one to specify models detailed enough to capture a causal relationship 
between Cohesion policy and growth (or convergence). A related problem is a lagged effect of 
different investments, which by definition have a long term effect, making it an almost 
insurmountable challenge for the testing approach (Begg, 2006) when relatively short time-series 
are available.  
Given the above mentioned limitations and challenges it appears that an undisputable and 
conclusive assessment on the Cohesion policy’s impact on macroeconomic parameters seems to 
represent an overoptimistic expectation. Hence, as argued by (Molle, 2007), the effectiveness of 
Cohesion policy “needs to be taken in terms of plausability instead of proof” (ibid., 230). 
This drove us to take a different course in this paper: evaluation of macroeconomic effects of 
Cohesion policy is tackled with a testing methodology in an indirect manner. The approach of this 
paper hence rests on the following logic: Cohesion policy expenditures represent only a part of a 
broader package of public economic development policies. If it is true that on average, government 
spending on the provision of public goods, particularly infrastructure and education, promotes 
economic growth; and at the same time that Cohesion funds are allocated according to the 
institutional practice of the given region or country; then it can be argued that the particular 
impact of Cohesion funds will be comparable to the macroeconomic impact of general public 
spending on the above mentioned public goods. As will be shown, the existing empirical evidence 
does indeed assess this relationship to be predominantly positive. Thus, the fundamental question is 
no longer the direct impact of Cohesion funds on the economy, but rather the extent to which they 
increase the amount of public spending, allocated for promoting development in target areas. This 
so-called ‘additionality’ principle of Cohesion funds is the necessary condition for any positive net 
effects to occur in the recipient country or region, while the actual effect of each particular 
investment will depend on: a.) micro-efficiency of the spent resources and b.) impact of public 
investment on private investment.  
There are thus four fundamental assumptions with the above argument: 1.) the public economic 
development expenditures contribute to economic growth; 2.) the impact of Cohesion policy 
resources is comparable to those of general public expenditure for the same purpose; 3.) the 
Cohesion policy resources increase the total amount of spending, allocated for economic 
development in target areas (additionality principle) and 4.) there is no negative impact of public 
investment on private investment, i.e. crowding out. The question of micro-efficiency has been 
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studied in depth in other studies (e.g. Wostner, 2008). 
The first assumption is analyzed in the next section. The second assumption has its critics, who 
argue that due to lower marginal costs the decision-making in Cohesion policy is less efficient than 
otherwise (refer to de la Fuente, 2003 for discussion), such statements however do not seem to be 
confirmed by evaluations (Eureval and Rambol management, 2008; European Investment Bank. 
2007). Furthermore, due to full integration of Cohesion policy resources in the public policy 
framework, at least in the major recipients, and the significantly greater extent of controls on 
Cohesion policy spending (Rafalzik, 2008), our assumption seems to be realistic. The third 
assumption is the subject of this paper, while the fourth requires an additional comment. The 
crowding-out effect of public expenditure has been analyzed by (de la Fuente, 2003) on the case of 
Spain, who finds some net crowding-out only in case of subsidies, while for public expenditure in 
infrastructure, direct investment and training, de la Fuente even finds net crowding-in. The same 
conclusion is made by (Afonso and Alegre, 2008), who show, in the case of the EU27 for the 1976-
2001 period, that not only does public funding not reduced private investment, but has even 
contributed to additional boosts in private investment. 
The indirect estimation approach has been tried before (de la Fuente, 2003; de la Fuente and Vives, 
1995; Martin, 1998), since such an approach is very suitable for estimating long-term, supply-side 
impacts of the resources spent on the economy. Especially (de la Fuente and Vives, 1995) and (de la 
Fuente, 2003) seem to be particularly relevant: their estimate is based on the production function 
approach, where Cohesion policy “impacts” on the function’s inputs. Apart from the estimated 
elasticities, the greatest reproach could come from the aforementioned crowding-out and 
multiplication effects. Even in this case however, the author assumed that nothing would change 
with the other public expenditure, i.e. that Cohesion policy resources would be additional to 
existing public expenditure. 
The additionality principle1 admittedly represents one of the basic principles of Cohesion policy, not 
only since the reforms in 1988, but since its very beginnings. According to the reports by the 
European Commission, Member States tend to abide by this principle (e.g. European Commission, 
2004: 140); however, these claims are based on methodology that has been bilaterally agreed 
between respective Member States and the EC, who itself admits that there are a number of 
weaknesses: difficulties in comparing results across Member States, shortcomings in data 
comparability over programming periods, problems in capturing all relevant eligible expenditure, 
heterogeneity of the information provided, difficulties in verifying the reliability of data and the 
lack of a monitoring mechanism (European Commission, 2009: 11). To the best of our knowledge, 
these methodologies have never been evaluated by independent experts nor in any other way, 
hence, it is not surprising that throughout the history of the Cohesion policy serious doubts and 
skepticism have arisen with regard to the practical implementation of the additionality principle 
(Bachtler et al, forthcoming; Dardanelli, 1999; Ederveen et al, 2003; Tomkins and Twomey, 1992). 
This further supports our view that we are dealing with a vital, yet empirically under-researched 
area. (Ederveen et al, 2003) estimates that every Cohesion policy euro on average crowds-out 0.17 
euros of national regional policy funding, while (Dardanelli, 1999) is even more sceptical, claiming 
 
1 Art. 15 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006 laying down general provisions on the 
European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999. 
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that “full respect for this principle is virtually unattainable” (ibid., 78). Admittedly, doubts are 
expressed even by some high ranking European Commission officials (European Commission, 2008: 
31). Despite logical theoretical conclusions, this study is thus, to the best of our knowledge, the 
first to empirically analyze the mutual relationship between public spending in Member countries 
and the respective amounts of Cohesion funds received. 
The article is structured as follows. After the introduction, which also sets out the methodology of 
the paper, the second section presents a literature review on the role of public expenditure on 
economic growth (the first assumption above) as well as the theory of public expenditure, used to 
specify the empirical model. This is the subject of section three, followed by the presentation of 
model results in section four, which also includes the robustness analysis. Section five concludes 
and puts forward implications for Cohesion policy. 
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2. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 The role of public expenditure on economic growth 
The body of work, which evaluates the effect of public spending or public capital on economic 
growth is rather extensive; hence, studies that employ meta-analysis are all the more convenient. 
Among those published recently, three deserve particular attention. Firstly, (Nijkamp and Poot, 
2004) who seek to determine the impact of fiscal policies (public spending, defence spending, tax 
policy, and investment into infrastructure and education) on economic growth, based on 93 studies 
published in refereed journals between 1983 and 19982. According to their findings, the overall 
impact of all fiscal policies on long-term economic growth is generally weak, with many results 
being inconclusive; however, they identified a robust effect of investment in education and 
infrastructure. With regard to the latter, the authors state that 72 percent of the studies identified 
a significantly positive effect on economic growth, while one fifth of the studies did not arrive at 
conclusive results. It may be of interest that the studies that employed data at national level seem 
to have yielded more positive results, and that the same applies to those that are based on longer 
time series. This is an indication of the importance of externalities and the long-term nature of the 
effect, produced by investments in infrastructure. The studies analysed established even stronger 
support in the case of investment in education, as over 90 percent of them pointed to the 
statistically significant positive impact of such investments on economic growth. 
The second study that seeks to summarise the results in this field is (Romp and de Haan, 2007). 
They analysed 77 studies from the period between 1995 and 2006, whose central question relates to 
the effect of public capital on economic growth. The studies are classified into six groups: studies 
based on production function, cost function, vector autoregression, models relating to several 
countries, models that estimate the crowding-out effect, and approaches based on the theory of 
optimum scope of public capital. Compared to older overview analyses of this type (e.g. Sturm et 
al, 1998), they found that on average, newer studies tend to identify an even more positive impact 
of public capital on economic growth. In addition, these studies underline the heterogeneity of such 
impact in terms of results from respective countries, regions, or sectors. The importance of the 
quality and scope of existing infrastructure is particularly emphasized since investments are subject 
to diminishing returns of scope. Furthermore, the contribution of network effects is increasingly 
being focused on, as these effects result in non-linear relations. Also, the issue of the extent to 
which a particular investment addresses and solves a certain bottleneck is also raised more 
attentively than in older studies. According to some studies, the impact of public infrastructure also 
depends on institutional and political aspects. 
The most recent meta-analysis dates to 2008 (Bom and Ligthar, 2008). It systematically analyses 76 
studies that were published no later than in 2006, and which are based on the logic of public capital 
as an input to the production function. Sixty-eight of the studies analyzed, i.e. nearly 90 percent, 
established a positive effect of public capital on economic growth. The elasticity of GDP with regard 
to the changes in the amount of public capital (taking into account 13 properties of estimates, 
ranging from the type of data to the model specification) is estimated at 0.086, confirming the 
 
2 For a table that lists all studies included in the analysis, including their characteristics and key findings, see 
ibid, p. 96-100. 
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desirability of investment into public infrastructure from a macroeconomic point of view. The 
finding that a narrower definition of public capital or infrastructure (e.g. railway or airports) tends 
to bring a more positive effect than when it is defined more broadly (so as to include e.g. 
administration buildings), is also of particular interest from the aspect of this analysis. Moreover, 
elasticity was found to be higher when infrastructure was provided by local or regional authorities. 
Lastly, we include in this overview the results of (Afonso and Alegre, 2008), who established the 
effect of the composition of public spending on economic growth and productivity in the case of the 
EU27 in the period from 1971 to 2006. Employing a dynamic panel, they found that higher public 
spending and social transfers have a negative effect, and public investment has a positive effect on 
economic growth. Furthermore, the impact of public spending for economic purposes was also 
proven to be statistically significant, with public spending on education having a particularly 
significant positive effect. These two types of spending, as presented below, represent the key 
components of so-called ‘structural’ or ‘development’ spending.  
A positive impact of infrastructure and public capital on economic growth has also been established 
at the level of EU regions (Basile et al, 2001; Bronzini and Piselli, 2007; Charlot and Schmitt, 1999; 
de la Fuente and Vives 1995), however not uniquely so, as (Martin, 1998; Martin. 1999; Vanhoudt et 
al, 2000) do not find infrastructure as the appropriate instrument for development policy. 
Furthermore, at the regional level there are discussions on the direction of causality, with 
infrastructure being a cause of growth found by (Bronzini and Piselli, 2007) and its effect by 
(Vanhoudt, et al. 2000). An excellent illustration of the complexities, connected with investments 
in infrastructure, is put forward by (Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2008), who find that 
infrastructure endowment is important for growth, while the additional investment does not seem 
to be significant. Furthermore, endowment of neighbouring regions with infrastructure has a 
positive impact on a given region, while higher investment in those regions has a negative impact on 
the growth of a given region. This indicates that the timing and a coherent strategy for investment 
is of crucial importance to the effectiveness of public investment.  
The existing body of work thus estimates the effects of public capital or development spending on 
economic growth as predominantly (though not uniquely) positive. This conclusion is particularly 
robust in economies with underdeveloped infrastructure and in economies in which local and 
regional authorities play a leading role. The former is certainly a feature a majority of the target 
areas for Cohesion policy; with regard to the latter, a uniform assessment is hard to put forward. 
However, local and regional authorities are undoubtedly at least one of the key partners in the 
implementation of Cohesion policy, even when they are not directly in charge. It can therefore be 
concluded that Cohesion funds, assuming equal or similar productivity of investments, compared to 
other public investment funded by national funds, should be expected to have a positive effect on 
economic growth and productivity; when their inflow increases the amount of structural spending.  
2.2.Theory of public expenditures 
In order to specify the empirical model, the findings of the empirical studies quoted above are 
insufficient. Analysis of the effect of Cohesion funds on public spending, more specifically the part 
of public spending, aimed at promoting development (hereinafter referred to as structural 
spending), requires the factors that define their scope and amount must first be understood 
according to the theory.  
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As argued by (García and Martos, 2004: 8), explanations of the scope and amount of public 
spending, or the extent of government's role in an economy, is hardly governed by a single dominant 
theory, but rather by a large number of partial theories that tend to emphasize particular aspects. 
These include either the determinants of demand for public services or the composition of supply of 
such services, where, in addition, both economic and political aspects should be accounted for. The 
problem of explaining and the empirical testing of the effect of each particular factor is that 
several (partial) theories seem to be mutually complementary and interrelated. As a result, 
attempts to determine the impact of an individual factor without accounting for other theories 
were often impeded by the problem of omitted-variable bias (Shelton, 2007: 2230). 
As a logical consequence, modeling the scope and amount of public spending should include a 
control or test for significance of as many key theories or factors as possible, from among those 
listed below.  
Among the first theories that seek to explain the dynamics of the amount of public spending is the 
thesis (Cameron, 1978) that open economies have greater amounts of public spending. The thesis is 
supposedly based on the finding that such economies have a more unionised labour force which in 
turn leads to stronger demands for redistribution. (Rodrik, 1998) later provided alternative grounds 
for the same thesis as he found that the theory holds regardless of the development stage of the 
country, as well as for any type of public spending. He therefore argued that the reason for a larger 
scope and amount of public spending lies in insuring against external risks. 
The next theory defines the size of a country as the determinant of public spending (Alesina and 
Wacziarg, 1998). It is thought that, in larger countries, the per capita cost of public goods, due to 
their non-rivalness, is lower in large countries than in smaller ones; moreover, the preferences tend 
to be more heterogeneous in larger countries, which results in lesser common interest, which in 
turn leads to a lesser scope for, and amount of, public spending. Furthermore, smaller countries are 
more open to international trade and in case of worsening terms of trade, their costs are potentially 
higher. Both aspects point in the same direction, i.e. more spending on public goods in smaller 
countries.  
Notable theories regarding the scope of public spending also include Wagner's law which predicts 
that the scope of public spending, i.e. the scope of government, will increase with its level of 
development (e.g. Lamartina and Zaghini, 2008). This is thought to result from two motives: as a 
country develops, social complexity tends to increase as well, which in turn leads to greater 
demands for regulation and public intervention; on the other hand, certain public goods are seen as 
"luxury goods" by their nature (e.g. culture), which again means that their consumption will rise as 
the income increases. 
The Effectiveness of EU Cohesion Policy Revisited: Are EU Funds Really Additional? 
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Following a similar line of thought, (Meltzer and Richard, 1981) developed a theory according to 
which the scope and amount of public spending is not explained only by the level of development, 
but also income inequality of a society. Deriving from the median voter theory, they found that the 
median voter's benefits from taxation will be proportional to the average income; hence, the 
difference between the average and median income is proposed to explain the increase in public 
spending. Consistent with the interest group theory, greater pressure on redistribution could also be 
derived from the age structure of the population and unemployment level, which means that higher 
values for both, i.e. ageing populations and higher unemployment rate, would result in a higher 
amount of transfers. 
According to (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980), the level of public spending is also affected by the 
level of decentralisation in a country. A strong central level in a country will, in their opinion, have 
less trouble reaching an internal consensus for higher taxation while fiscal decentralisation is 
thought to prevent this (García and Martos, 2004: 25). 
In terms of identifying the effect on public structural spending, the anti-cyclical or stabilisation role 
of the government plays a particularly vital part. According to (Musgrave, 1959), this is one of the 
government's central three functions; hence, public spending is positively correlated to categories 
that either require a greater amount of transfers (e.g. unemployment level) or increased budget 
revenues (real economic growth). On the other hand, public spending is negatively correlated to 
categories that promote macroeconomic stability (e.g. inflation rate or extent of public debt). 
(Easterly and Levine, 1997) submit that the heterogeneity of preferences in a country, in addition to 
its size, is also affected by demographic factors; they specifically point out the ethnic 
fragmentation of the society. This theory is based on the assumption that the ethnical differences 
preclude a consensus on provision of public goods. Another possible interpretation is that the 
benefit of a public good for a particular ethnic group will be smaller if such good is shared with 
another ethnic group. 
Finally, the extent of public spending is thought to be affected by a series of political factors (refer 
for example to Potrafke, 2006). Most notably, these include the election year – a hypothesis 
proposed by (Nordhaus, 1975) as far back as  1975. The idea is based on the logic of political-
economic cycles. In other words, any government, regardless of its ideological alignment, will be 
tempted to stimulate economic growth just before the elections to improve its odds of re-election; 
these efforts, in turn, are expected to increase public spending. (Rogoff and Sibert, 1998) expanded 
this thesis to include the possibility of influence as early as in the pre-election year as the current 
government, based on its advantage in terms of access to information, seeks to communicate to the 
voters its ‘superior’ ability to govern (Potrafke, 2006: 4). On the contrary, (Alesina, 1987; Hibbs, 
1977) stress the importance of ideological alignment of each government, with the ones leaning to 
the left believed to be more likely to increase public spending due to their focus on the "working 
class", while the right-wing governments whose electorate predominantly consists of capital owners, 
will focus more on curbing inflation and, consequently, lower public spending. (Weingast et al, 
1981) propose the idea that the amount of public spending is also affected by the composition of 
the government: a greater number of "decision-makers" in coalition governments is thought to result 
in higher spending as making decisions in such governments is more difficult. (Persson et al,1998) 
and (Milesi-Ferretti et al, 2002) also point to the effect of the majority rule or proportional 
representation voting systems. According to (Persson et al, 1998), the majority rule is believed to 
The Effectiveness of EU Cohesion Policy Revisited: Are EU Funds Really Additional? 
European Policy Research Paper, No 69  European Policies Research Centre 9
                                                
reduce spending on public goods, yet increase the amount of transfers; on the other hand, (Milesi-
Ferretti et al, 2002) argue that due to the election method, a majority rule following a geographic 
principle will exhibit a greater propensity to provide public goods. In the context of income 
inequalities, (Shelton, 2007) also makes a case for the role of political rights which can affect the 
representation of particular segments of the electorate at the elections.  
3. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The analysis of the effect of Cohesion policy at the EU level is considerably impeded by the 
availability of data. Due to a very short time period in which the new Member States, i.e. the states 
that joined the EU in 2004 or later, have taken part in Cohesion policy, the analysis must inevitably 
focus on the EU15, i.e. the countries that were EU Member States prior to the year 2004.  
3.1 Data 
The data used was mostly acquired from Eurostat, which allows a high level of data comparability; 
in addition, this is the data used by the European Commission in its (official) analyses. Since most of 
the data required are only available at the level of particular countries, analysis at lower levels is 
not possible. In addition, time series are also rather restricted at the country level as well. This, as 
well as the commonly recognised advantages of its use3, led us to derive our results from panel 
data. The length of the time series differs from one country to another, which means that the panel 
is unbalanced. For most countries, the data are available for the period between 1995 and 2006 - 
that is for 12 years. Depending on model specification, Greece has the shortest time series with five 
years, while Italy and Great Britain have the longest time series with 17 years (from 1990 to 2006). 
Data on inflow of Cohesion funds by country were obtained from the financial reports of the 
European Commission (European Commission. 2007; European Commission, 2008) and therefore do 
not relate to the appropriations for commitments, but to actual inflows received by the Member 
States in each year. The analysis based on actual inflows is of key importance as Cohesion policy has 
seen considerable time lags between the commitments and the actual payments. This is particularly 
notable for the period before 2000; after which, the so-called "N+2" rule applied, which means that 
a country should spend its available commitments no later than in the following two years, or there 
would be so-called ‘decommittment’. 
 
3 See e.g. Baltagi: 2008: 6-8. 
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Table 1: Average amounts of inflows from Cohesion policy by programming periods and average 
amounts of structural expenditures in these periods; presented as percentage of GDP 
CP inflows Struct. Exp. CP inflows Struct. Exp. CP inflows Struct. Exp.
Belgium 0,1 0,2 11,5 0,1 11,7
Denmark 0,1 12,2 0,1 12,5 0,1 12,2
Germany 10,5 0,2 10,6 0,2 8,6
Greece 2,1 8,3 1,5 8,9
Spain 0,7 1,2 10,2 1,0 10,0
France 0,1 0,2 10,6 0,1 10,1
Ireland 1,8 10,1 0,5 9,5
Italy 0,2 11,7 0,3 9,9 0,3 9,6
Luxembourg 0,1 12,7 0,1 10,6 0,0 10,1
Netherlands 0,1 0,1 10,7 0,1 10,8
Austria 0,2 12,0 0,1 11,5
Portugal 3,0 13,0 2,0 12,5
Finland 14,8 0,2 13,6 0,2 10,9
Sweden 0,1 12,3 0,1 12,1
UK 0,2 8,8 0,2 7,9 0,1 9,2
1990* - 1993 1994 - 1999 2000 - 2006
 
 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations. 
Note: * Subject to data availability, initial year differs from one country to another 
 
The data on public spending were also obtained from the Eurostat database. The Eurostat 
methodology is based on the European System of National Accounts (ESA95) and on the 
Classification of the Functions of the Government which defines economic functions for which 
public sector funding was used. Due to our interest in the additionality, we were particularly 
interested in those areas that can be co-financed with Cohesion policy funds. The European 
Commission is using the term "structural expenditure" for this group of expenditures (see European 
Commission, 2006) This group comprises of all expenditure for economic purposes (which includes a 
wide array of fields, ranging from research and development and entrepreneurship promotion to 
agriculture and transport, including infrastructure), environment protection, and education. The 
average size of structural expenditure ranges between 10 and 11% of GDP (refer to table 1), which 
noticeably exceeds the amounts in the official methodology, agreed between the European 
Commission and particular Member States. For the 2007-2013 period, these account for 5.6% of GDP 
for the convergence regions (European Commission, 2009: 9). The use of official statistics thus 
means that the relationship with Cohesion expenditure will be harder to empirically evaluate, 
nevertheless such an approach, due to the objectiveness and comparability of data, gives the result 
the necessary credibility. 
The data on public expenditure, not related to the level of central government, were used as a 
control for the effect of the level of fiscal decentralization. This data, too, is derived from the 
Eurostat database. The section of the Eurostat database "Government deficit and debt" was the 
source of data on public debt, which refer to the consolidated gross debt of the public sector. The 
government balance refers to the surplus or deficit of the entire public sector, i.e. both central 
government and regional and local levels, as well as social funds; it is available at the Eurostat web 
page via Euroindicators. The key problem of data availability for the government balance appears in 
the case of Greece where data, in the time of writing, was only available as of 2002. 
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Availability of a longer time series led us to obtain data on the rate of inflation and rate of 
unemployment from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; partial data on 
election dates were obtained from (Potrafke, 2006) to be subsequently updated with the data 
obtained from the world-wide web. All other data, i.e. the data on gross domestic product, 
demographic and income statistics, and openness to trade, were obtained from Eurostat. The data 
on gross domestic product in particular restricts the length of the time series as they are only 
available for all countries according to ESA 95 from 1995 onwards. 
3.2. Econometric model specification 
Based on the conclusions from the public spending theory, the following panel model specification 
seems to best capture the dynamics of structural expenditure for the selected 15 European 
countries:  
STREXPi,t = c + β1 CPi,t + β2 CP2i,t + β3 DELTAEXPi,t + β4 PUBDEBTi,t + β5 GOVBALi,t +  
β6 INFLi,t-1 + β7 EMU + β8 BDPpcPPSi,t + β9 UNEMi,t + β10 POPi,t + β11 DECENTRi,t +  
ELECi + αi + αt + ui,t 
where: 
 Indices i and t relate to the country and year, respectively; 
 Dependent variable STREXP represents the amount of structural expenditures. i.e. the sum 
of all public spending at all levels of government, for economic purposes (including 
infrastructure), education, and environment protection, consistently with the COFOG 
classification; it is expressed as a percentage of the GDP;  
 c is a constant term; 
 CP indicates the amount of funds’ inflow from the Cohesion policy, expressed as a 
percentage of the country’s GDP; CP2 is its square;  
 DELTAEXP is a variable that includes all other categories of public expenditure, except 
structural expenditure;  
 PUBDEBT refers to the amount of a country's public debt as a percentage of GDP; 
 GOVBAL means government balance, expressed as a percentage of GDP (a negative value 
indicates a deficit, a positive value indicates a surplus);  
 INFL relates to the annual inflation rate, expressed as a percentage change in consumer 
prices compared to the previous period (OECD data);  
 EMU is a dummy variable for the period from accession to the economic and monetary union 
in each respective country (1999 is the first year for all Member States, except for Greece 
whose relevant period starts with 2001); 
 BDPpcPPS means gross domestic product per capita expressed in purchasing power standard; 
 UNEM refers to the unemployment rate (OECD data); 
 POP is the average population;  
 DECENTR is the share of total public expenditure not related to the level of central 
government;  
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 ELEC is a dummy variably for the election year in each country. If the elections were held in 
the second half of the year, the same year is identified as the election year; if, however, 
the elections were held in the first half of the year, the previous year counts as the election 
year; 
 αi are country-specific dummy variables, controlling for the unobserved time-invariant 
effects; 
 αt are yearly time dummies, controlling for the effect of e.g. Europe-wide economic cycles, 
external shocks, etc.  
 ui,t are unexplained residuals of the regression model, normally distributed with a zero 
mean and a constant variance σ2u. 
According to the public expenditures theory, several important determinants of the amount of 
public spending is virtually time invariant (e.g. ethnical fragmentation of a society, political rights, 
majority rule or proportional representation voting system, etc.); while all these determinants 
could not explicitly be included in the model. Therefore, it is very likely that the model will require 
controls for the fixed effects. 
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4. RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
4.1 Analysis results 
The results of the selected panel model are presented in Table 2 
Table 2: Results of the selected fixed effects panel model for the EU15 
Dependent var..: STREXP Coefficient Standard Error Significance
CP  1.5695 (0.617) **
CP2 -32.4761 ( 15.910) **
DELTATOT -0.0981 (0.057) *
PUBDEBT  -0.0006 (0.000) ***
GOVBAL -0.0032 (0.000) ***
INFL L1. -0.0027 (0.001) ***
EMU  -0.0064 (0.002) *
BDPpcPPS  -7.40E-08 (0.000)
UNEM  0.0012 (0.000) **
POP 8.15E-08 (0.000) ***
DECENTR  -0.0776 (0.024) ***
ELECi Yes ***
Time Dummy Variable (αt) Yes ***
Constant -0.0036 (0.025)
 R2
within  0.7150
between 0.4201 
total 0.3619  
# No. of observations 170
Legend: Standard errors in parenthesis using Huber/White/sandwich estimator. ***, **, * refer to the 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
Source: own calculations 
The estimated model, explaining the dynamics of structural expenditures, with fixed effects 
included, has proven appropriate and highly significant; its explanatory power is surprisingly high. 
This model explains 71 percent of the variance in structural expenditure for the sample of EU 
Member States; at the same time, the signs of the regression coefficients for all variables were 
consistent with the theoretical expectations and, as a rule, the coefficients were statistically 
significant. 
The effect of the inflows of Cohesion policy funds (CP), a variable that is the most important for the 
model’s purpose, is statistically significant, positive, but non-linear. The partial effect of Cohesion 
inflows on the amount of public structural expenditure is presented in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Partial average estimated effect of Cohesion policy inflows on the amount of 
structural expenditures 
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Our results indicate that the Cohesion policy inflows represent additional public spending; hence, 
Cohesion policy funds increase (rather than substitute) the public structural expenditure in 
recipient countries. In case of moderate inflows (up to approximately 1.75 percent of GDP), the 
additionality of funds is estimated on average to be complete. With minor inflows, the model even 
shows that the extent of structural expenditures is not only increased by the entire inflow of 
Cohesion funds, but also by the required sum of own co-financing, which represents an additional 
leverage for Cohesion policy funds. In case of a more considerable inflow of Cohesion funds 
(between approximately 1.75 and 2.33 percent of GDP p.a.), a minor rate of substitution was 
observed, in the range of up to 20 percent of total Cohesion fund inflows. It then follows that at 
least 80 percent of the inflows represent a net increase in the amount of structural expenditure in 
the recipient countries. With inflows greater than 2.33 percent of GDP annually, the data has shown 
a more considerable rate of substitution, or crowding out of domestic public structural expenditure. 
For example, if the inflow of Cohesion funds amounts to 3 percent of GDP, the increase in structural 
expenditure will only reach 60 percent. It should be added however that throughout the history of 
Cohesion policy, inflows of over 2.33 percent were granted only in exceptional circumstances (a 
total of 8 country-years), which means that in the majority of the years, and countries, Cohesion 
funds virtually in their entirety increased the amount of public structural expenditure, thus 
introducing an additional development incentive deriving from public funds. 
The following section presents the estimated effect of other explanatory variables, which were 
included in the model based on relevant theories of public expenditure. Additional explanatory 
variables not only improve the explanatory power of the model; from the aspect of consistency in 
estimated results, their omission would be unacceptable as it would lead to omitted variable bias 
(e.g. Greene, 2000: 334). 
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The second group of important findings relates to the role of macroeconomic conditions and the 
country's economic policy when defining structural expenditure. A statistically significant negative 
effect of other public expenditure (DELTATOT) indicates that the total amount of public spending is 
relatively fixed and that other expenditures can only increase at the expense of structural 
expenditure. This may occur due to, for example, an increase in social transfers in cases of 
economic recession, which can also explain the positive sign of the effect of unemployment (UNEM). 
The effect of the increase of other public spending (transfers) in the case of recession is already 
encompassed by the DELTATOT variable; ceteris paribus, confirming the expectation that countries 
with more unemployed potentials will invest more in economic growth. Negative, though not 
statistically significant, a sign of the effect of the level of development (BDPpcPPS) on the amount 
of structural spending implies that the Wagner's Law does not apply to the segment of structural 
expenditure. Intuitively, this result can hardly come as a surprise, since the effect of considerable 
investment requirements in countries at a lower development stage in the EU, obviously, outweighs 
the factors, proposed by this law.  
Counter-cyclically, the stabilization function of the government is entirely confirmed in the case of 
inflation rate (INFL). Its effect is statistically significant and negative; however, it should be noted 
that the effect with a time lag of one year exhibits even greater statistical significance, which 
points to the fact that we are not dealing with automatic stabilizers but rather a deferred effect of 
economic policy. The importance of pressures for sustainable public finances are also highlighted by 
the variables of public debt (PUBDEBT), government balance (GOVBAL), and the effect of economic 
and monetary union (EMU). All three variables exhibit a negative effect on structural expenditures, 
meaning that an improvement of government balance will also be reflected in a decrease in 
structural expenditure; the same applies to the effect of entering the economic and monetary 
union. It can be concluded that macroeconomic conditions have a considerable effect on the overall 
effectiveness of Cohesion policy as they make a key contribution in defining the amount of 
structural expenditure in Member States, i.e. the part of public expenditure for promoting 
economic growth and crucial for the positive effects of Cohesion funds on the Member States’ 
growth to be realistically expected. 
The third group of explanatory variables relates to the political-demographic factors. A large part of 
these effects is relatively fixed in time and since all cannot be explicitly included in the model, 
they are controlled by fixed effects (αi) for each country. As explained by the public expenditures 
theory, these include: ethnical fragmentation, the voting system, or political rights in the countries. 
It is therefore hardly surprising that the F-test for the group of fixed effects proves them highly 
significant and different from zero. A significant positive effect of the population (POP) may at first 
appear to contradict theoretical expectations; however, it can be explained by lesser total costs for 
other policies (economies of scale), which enables savings in larger countries and therefore a 
greater scope and amount of structural expenditure. It should nevertheless be added, that the 
effect is quite small. The variable of the level of decentralization (DECENTR) is also highly 
significant and it indicates that a higher rate of fiscal decentralisation, consistently with theoretical 
expectations, is related to lower structural spending in a country. Finally, the political factors 
include a statistically significant effect of the election year (ELECi), which – along with the 
previously presented findings – supports the notion that political factors in particular bear a notable 
effect on the scope, amount, and composition of public spending. 
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4.1. Robustness analysis 
In order to test the robustness of the estimated results in the model above, a series of alternative 
specifications were conducted, confirming the findings of our original model. From the aspect of the 
method employed, it has already been noted that unobserved, fixed, effects are statistically 
significant and that as a result, the model of random effects is not appropriate, or rather, will not 
yield unbiased estimates; this was also confirmed by the Hausman test. The possibility of effect 
with a time lag was also checked for all variables; however, this only proved appropriate in the case 
of changes in the rate of inflation. Any non-linear and logarithmic relations values of variables were 
also tested. 
Alternative model specifications also included, a test for the validity of the so-called theory of 
incremental public expenditure growth (Wildavsky, 1985), which states that the most important 
determinant of the amount and composition of public expenditure is its composition in the previous 
year. The Arellano-Bond model was used for a dynamic specification of the model (see last column 
of the Table 3), estimated by a generalised method of moments and using a lagged dependent 
variable and first differences of other explanatory variables. The Sargan test did not reject the 
hypothesis that the model specification is valid and the possibility of second-order autocorrelation is 
denied (which is a precondition for the use of the model), however, the lagged dependent variable 
proves not to be statistically significant which fails to confirm the theory of incremental public 
spending growth and simultaneously confirms, or validates, the static specification of the model. 
In addition to the key variables presented above, some additional or alternative variables were 
tested which are relevant from the theoretical perspective, but failed to prove significant. Hence, 
as an alternative specification for gross domestic product per capita, real growth of the gross 
domestic product (BDPRG, see second column of Table 3) was tested; for some countries, the time 
series available is somewhat longer than in the original model. In this case, too, the estimated 
relationship is negative, which could support the notion that in the time of economic growth, 
governments are either seeking to re-structure public finance to a greater extent, or trying to 
implement counter-cyclical measures; in any case, the effect is statistically not significant. In 
addition, virtually all other parameters remained robust and significant. The theoretically indicated 
effect of a country's openness to trade was also tested, as well as the effect of income inequality 
and the importance of population age structure for the dynamics of structural expenditures. 
Openness to trade (TRADEOP) was calculated as a sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP, 
while income inequality (INCIN) was included as the income quantile share ratio where some missing 
data was estimated by means of linear intrapolation. The effect of age structure was estimated as 
the share of population aged over 65 (OLDAGE); the source of data for all three variables was the 
Eurostat database. As can be seen from the fourth column of Table 3, all were proven statistically 
non-significant and without substantial effect on the value and significance of other parameters in 
the model, while the effect of Cohesion inflows on structural expenditure is even slightly greater 
with this specification. 
The results of the model have also been proven to be robust to the exclusion, or omission, of the 
non-significant variable (BDPpcPPS, i.e. GDP per capita in purchasing power standards) from the 
basic model, which can be seen from column three in Table 3. Similar to the previous case, the 
coefficients on the effect of the Cohesion inflows on structural expenditure is increased somewhat, 
however, we decided to keep this variable in the basic model due to the control power of the GDP 
per capita. Robustness in relation to the exclusion of individual countries was also 
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tested. The results have proven robust to the exclusion of all countries except for Ireland and 
Portugal – which is not surprising. In addition to Greece whose weight within the model is 
diminished because of the restricted time series of available data on government balance, these are 
the only two Member States that have received extensive inflows of Cohesion funds. Their decisive 
effect on the significance of regression coefficients for Cohesion policy was thus expected. 
Nevertheless, we also tested what happens if the variable of the government balance is also 
omitted; in this case, Greece, too, affects the results over the entire span of 12 years. The signs 
and significance of regression coefficients remained similar to those of the basic specification. The 
most obvious change was a somewhat more considerable increase in the coefficients for Cohesion 
fund inflows. If, in addition to the previously eliminated variable, Portugal is also eliminated from 
this specification, the estimated effect of Cohesion funds is again within the range of the values 
yielded by the basic model specification. 
The robustness tests presented above have proven that the model is reliable; that the magnitude of 
the estimated regression coefficients does deviate from one specification to another, but these 
deviations generally do not affect their significance; and, above all, that these deviations remain 
reasonably moderate and do not affect the conclusions and findings yielded by the model. Finally, 
the estimated value of the effect of Cohesion funds on the scope and amount of structural 
expenditures in the selected model is the mean value in the span of various alternative 
specifications, which additionally increases the reliability of the results. 
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Table 3: Robustness analysis of the estimated model (various specifications and data samples; dependent variable is the amount of structural expenditure - percentage of GDP)  
Basic model Real GDP Growth
Without insig. 
control var. 
Spec. with all 
control var. Without Ireland Without Portugal
Without 
GOVBAL
Without 
GOVBAL and 
Portugal Arellano Bond
CP  1.5695**  1.6087***  1.6962*** 1.8077***  1.1271 0.3122 2.7430**  1.8659 1.0605*
(0.617) ( 0.592) ( 0.608) ( 0.642) (0.760) (0.842) (1.250) (1.243) (0.563)
CP2 -32.4761**  -34.6754**  -36.2443**  -35.1613** -26.075 22.6403  -69.3560** -32.5451 -18.7356
( 15.910) ( 14.343) (  15.618) (  16.905) (18.095) (37.277) (32.659) (33.678) ( 14.382)
DELTATOT -0.0981*  -0.1274** -0.0399 -0.0806  -0.0839  -0.1421**  -0.0034 -0.0324  -0.1582***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.059) (0.060) (0.058) (0.068) (0.060) (0.076) (0.046)
PUBDEBT  -0.0006***  -0.0005***  -0.0005***  -0.0004*** -0.0007***  -0.0006***  -0.0007***  -0.0007***  -0.0005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GOVBAL -0.0032***  -0.0028***  -0.0026***  -0.0031***  -0.0031*** -0.0034***  -0.0033***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
INFL L1. -0.0027***   -0.0018***   -0.0020***   -0.0024***  -0.0029***   -0.0025***   -0.0034***   -0.0035*** -0.0024***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
EMU  -0.0064* -0.0085*** -0.0097*** -0.0042* -0.0058*** -0.0066*** -0.0052** -0.0051** -0.0060***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
BDPpcPPS  -7.40E-08 -2.33E-07 2.33E-08 -4.25E-08 5.65E-07* 6.64E-07 -1.12E-07
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
UNEM  0.0012** 0.0006 0.0004 0.0005 0.0009 0.0023** 0.0008 0.0009 0.0015***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
POP 8.15E-08*** 6.60E-09*** 6.00E-09*** 6.38E-09*** 8.01E-09*** 8.40E-09*** 1.06E-08*** 1.08E-08*** 8.98E-09***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DECENTR  -0.0776*** -0.0496** -0.0314 -0.0636** -0.0987*** -0.0737*** -0.2017*** -0.1979*** -0.0940***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.062) (0.067) (0.029)
BDPRG  -0.0004
(0.000)
STREXP L1 0.0138
(0.071)
OLDAGE -0.0023
(0.002)
INCIN -0.0009
(0.002)
TRADEOP -0.0012
(0.006)
ELECi Yes*** Yes** Yes* Yes*** Yes** Yes*** Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummy Variable (αt) Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes* Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 R2
within  0.7150 0.7126 0.6657 0.6662  0.7310 0.7322 0.5444 0.5557
between 0.4201  0.3549 0.3714 0.4180 0.4980 0.4418 0.3670 0.3714
total 0.3619  0.3420 0.3237 0.3744 0.4423 0.3703 0.2361 0.2243
# No. of observations 170 182 192 167 158 158 179 167 148
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis using Huber/White/sandwich estimator. ***, **, * refer to the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
Source: own calculations. 
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5. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR COHESION POLICY 
Whether the Cohesion policy resources contribute to convergence, higher growth for 
targeted areas, create jobs, and strengthen competitiveness, remains, at least from the 
scientific perspective, an open question. The differences in the assessment of Cohesion 
policy’s effectiveness can be explained to a considerable extent, though not entirely, by 
the methodological approach employed therein. In an ideal world, the “econometric” or 
“testing approach” would seem to be the most appropriate as it is directly measures the 
effect of the used resources; it too however is faced with methodological limitations as 
shown, among others, by the inconclusive results of this group of evaluations. A literature 
review shows (Wostner, 2009) that one cannot render econometric studies to give a 
predominantly negative assessment as is often argued (e.g. Gripaios, et al. 2008), although 
it is true that the non-robustness of the results seems to be almost a systemic property of 
this approach (Florax et al, 2002; Levine and Renelt, 1992; Roodman, 2007).  
We would argue that there are three main arguments for the problematic nature of direct 
testing of the macroeconomic effectiveness of Cohesion policy resources. First, the 
Cohesion funds in the context of all other, more dominant and complexly interwoven 
determinants of economic growth, simply represent a shock that is (too) minute to allow 
for its clear identification (OECD, 2007: 129). This argument is also related to the problem 
of threshold effects implied by new economic geography theory as pointed out for example 
by (Ottaviano, 2003) and (Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2007). Second, regarding its content, 
Cohesion policy is highly heterogeneous both in terms of the purposes and in terms of 
extremely varied “initial conditions” addressed and dealt with in different target areas. 
Hence, a "simple" determination of average macro effect seems rather inappropriate in the 
case of such diverse contexts. Third, the available data, including that for Cohesion policy 
expenditure, does not allow us, at least at this stage, to specify models detailed enough to 
capture causal relationships between Cohesion policy and growth (or convergence). A 
related problem is a lagged effect of different investments, which could even theoretically 
be expected only in the long term, making it an almost insurmountable challenge for the 
testing approach (Begg, 2006). 
This drove us to take a different course in this paper: evaluation of macroeconomic effects 
of the Cohesion policy is tackled with testing in an indirect manner. The approach of this 
paper hence rests on the following logic. Cohesion policy expenditures represent a part of 
the broader package of public economic development policies. If it is true that, on average, 
government spending on the provision of public goods, particularly infrastructure and 
education, promotes economic growth, and considering the fact that Cohesion funds are 
commonly allocated according to the institutional practice of the given region or country, 
then it can be concluded that the impact of Cohesion funds will be comparable to the 
macroeconomic impact of general public spending on the above mentioned public goods. 
The existing empirical evidence does indeed assess this relationship to be predominantly 
positive. Thus, the fundamental question we have posed was no longer what kind of impact 
Cohesion funds bring directly to the economy but rather to what extent they increase the 
amount of public spending, allocated for promoting development in target areas. This, so-
called additionality of Cohesion funds, is the necessary condition for any positive net 
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effects to occur in the recipient country or region; while the actual effect of each 
particular investment, will depend on: a.) micro-efficiency of the expenditures and b.) the 
impact of public on private investment. The question of micro-efficiency has been studied 
in depth in other studies (e.g. Wostner, 2008), while the work on the second question even 
points to additional crowding-in as opposed to the crowding-out effect (Afonso and Alegre, 
2008; de la Fuente, 2003).  
The additionality principle admittedly represents one of the basic principles of Cohesion 
policy, not only since the reform in 1988, but since its very beginnings. Despite its vital 
importance, our study is to the best of our knowledge, the first to empirically analyze the 
mutual relation between public spending in Member countries and their respective amounts 
of Cohesion funds received, outside of the official negotiating framework with the European 
Commission. This holds true even though throughout the history of the Cohesion policy, 
serious doubts and skepticism have arisen with regard to the practical implementation of 
the additionality principle (Bachtler et al, forthcoming; Dardanelli, 1999; Ederveen et al, 
2003; Tomkins and Twomey, 1992).  
Based on an econometric model we have found that inflows from Cohesion funds actually 
result in additional public expenditure and that hence, the Cohesion policy funds tend to 
increase the net amount of public structural expenditure in recipient countries. The 
relationship has the shape of a quadratic function, which indicates that in the case of 
smaller inflows, Cohesion funds tend to set in motion additional leverage through the 
increase in structural expenditure resulting from the requirement for co-financing; on the 
other hand, crowding out of national public spending can be observed with higher inflows. 
Nevertheless, this negative effect only occurs with relatively high inflows; hence, Cohesion 
funds can be positively identified as net additional stimulus for development and growth, 
fuelled by public funding throughout the predominant part of the spectrum of actual 
inflows. 
Thus, the necessary condition of "plausable effectiveness of Cohesion policy" according to 
(Molle, 2007) has been met, which however, does not represent a sufficient condition on 
which to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of a particular country or regions. Meeting 
such a sufficient condition requires provision of effective and successful management of 
public funds at the micro level, an aspect that has also been pointed out by (Vanhoudt et 
al, 2000), who suggest that in order to define the productivity of capital expenditures in 
Europe, "(...)project selection and performance need to be studied in more detail. This 
clearly calls for a complementary bottom-up approach (...)" (ibid, 102). The second 
sufficient condition rests on the impact of public funding on private investment. According 
to (Afonso and Alegre, 2008; de la Fuente, 2003) there seems to be even a crowding-in 
effect, this however would also need to remain true in a given region or Member State 
under consideration. 
Results of the macro-level Cohesion policy performance analysis are not as disappointing as 
it is often alleged, as this policy seems to fulfil its fundamental mission of increasing public 
development investments in target areas. Given their – at least on average – estimated 
positive impact, this means that in terms of attaining its goals, Cohesion policy rests on 
reasonably sound empirical foundations. Given the restrictions with regard to the 
European Policy Research Paper, No 69 20 European Policies Research Centre 
The macroeconomic impact of EU Cohesion Policy revisited 
methodology and data availability, it would nevertheless be reasonable to devote additional 
attention to defining more specific indicators that would be consistent with the particular 
purpose, for which the funds are granted; however, due to data restrictions this would only 
be possible at lower geographic levels (e.g. individual Member State, or preferably regions). 
Due to the same reason, experimental and quasi-experimental methods seem also to be a 
promising way forward.  
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